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During the United Nations' first two decades it seemed to be firmly
established that the UN would take no action with respect to the com-
plaints of persons claiming to be oppressed by their own governments.
Toward the end of these two decades, however, a set of practices grew
up applicable to colonies and to the Republic of South Africa, which
utilized individuals' complaints and gave them very wide notice. So
extensive a set of practices was bound in the end to lap over into the
broader area of human rights complaints generally.
In the first half of the decade of the 1960's, the Committee on
Colonialism of the UN General Assembly, followed shortly thereafter
by the Committee on South African Apartheid, began holding hearings
for complainants and publishing their written complaints. While some
felt that this process produced very little result, the mere publication,
either in writing or orally, of individuals' complaints, was a new field of
activity for the UN.' As a result of some of the complaints which were
brought to the surface by this process in the Colonialism Committee,
the General Assembly in October, 1966, in a landmark resolution, Num-
ber 2144, invited the Economic and Social Council and the Commission
on Human Rights to give urgent consideration to ways and means of
improving the capability of the UN to put a stop to violations of human
rights wherever they might occur.2 This resolution opened a door which
would be very difficult for anyone now or in the future to close. Efforts
were made during the February-March 1968 session of the UN Human
Rights Commission to close that door,' but it nevertheless remains open.
' See Carey, The United Nations' Double Standard on Human Rights Com-
plaints, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (1966).
2 U.N. Doc. A/2144 (XXI) (1966).
8 The events at the Human Rights Commission's 1967 session described herein
are officially set forth in the Commission's Report on the Twenty-Fourth Session,
U.N. Doc. E/4475-E/CN.4/972 (1968) at 58-79. Summaries of the statements
made with respect to the subject herein treated are published as U.N. Docs.
E/CN.4/SR.964-974 (1968).
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Just how far the door is open, and how much effort is necessary to keep
it even that far ajar, can be seen by looking at developments which oc-
curred between October, 1966, when the General Assembly opened
the door, and the early part of 1968 when the efforts to close it were
thwarted.
The Door Opens Wider
The UN Human Rights Commission, meeting in early 1967, shortly
after General Assembly resolution 2144 was adopted, resolved to ask
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to bring to the Commission's attention any situation which
the Sub-Commission had reasonable cause to believe revealed a con-
sistent pattern of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in any country, including policies of racial discrimination, segregation
and apartheid, with particular reference to colonial and dependent ter-
ritories.' In addition, the Human Rights Commission asked the Sub-
Commission to prepare a report containing information on violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms from all available sources.
Later, in June, 1967, the Economic and Social Council gave its blessing
to these arrangements, and in addition, took a step of great significance
in giving authority to both the Commission and the Sub-Commission to
examine the many hundreds and thousands of written human rights
complaints which flow yearly to the UN.5 This authority was granted
for the explicit purpose of complying with the duties assigned to the
Commission and Sub-Commission with respect to their annual consider-
ation of the question of violations of fundamental rights throughout the
world.
Prior to June 1967, the thousands of written complaints coming to
the UN each year were handled in accordance with a highly restrictive
arrangement contained in ECOSOC resolution 728F of 1959, which was
only the latest of a series of similar provisions dating back to the early
days of UN.6 Under these rules, complaints relating to any parts of
the world other than colonies or South Africa were simply filed at UN
Headquarters, and a form letter sent to the complainant, advising that
4 Commission resolution 8(XXIII); see Report of the Twenty-Third Session,
U.N. Doc. E/4322-E/CN.4/940 (1967) at 131.
5 U.N. Doc. E/ 1235 (XLII).
6 The history of UN procedures for dealing with human rights complaints is
officially recited in U.N. Doc. A/C.32/6 (1968) at 142-149.
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substantially nothing could be done.7 A copy was sent without the
name of the author to the state complained against, for any comments
which it might care to make.
Greece and Haiti
The new procedure under ECOSOC resolution 1235 allowed the
Commission and Sub-Commission to look at these complaints in the
original form instead of in the form of mere summaries prepared by the
Secretariat. The new procedure was first put into effect at the meeting
of the Sub-Commission in Geneva in October, 1967. The outcome was
a resolution adopted without any contrary vote, recommending to the
Human Rights Commission further investigation concerning not only
those parts of South Africa which had become traditional targets of
UN investigation, but also in two countries elsewhere in the world,
Greece and Haiti.8 It was in this manner that the Sub-Commission
complied with the Commission's request that situations revealing con-
sistent patterns of violations be brought to the Commission's attention.
The Sub-Commission's compliance with the Commission's other
request, to prepare a report containing information on violations from
all available sources, was met by means of a one-page annex to the
resolution.' As to South Africa, this annex cited various documents al-
ready published by the UN and therefore fully available to any member
of the public. Concerning Greece and Haiti, however, a new departure
was represented in the annex. In the case of these two countries, the
annex referred to communications received by the Sub-Commission pur-
suant to ECOSOC Resolution 1235 and identified at a meeting of the
Sub-Commission held in private by virtue of ECOSOC resolution 728F."
In the case of Greece, the government's response was also cited. By
this kind of coded reference, the secrecy of the communications was
As early as 1947 the Economic and Social Council in resolution 75(V) had
approved a statement that the Human Rights Commission "recognizes that it
has no power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human
rights."
8 Sub-Commission resolution 3 (XX); see report of Sub-Commission's Twentieth
Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/947-E/CN.4/Sub.2/286 (1947) at 38.
1 Id. at 42.
10 ECOSOC resolution 728F (XXVIII) requested the Secretary-General to
distribute "in private meeting" to Commission and Sub-Commission members
"a confidential list containing a brief indication of the substance" of complaints
alleging specific human rights violations. ECOSOC resolution 1235 (XLII)
authorized examination by the Commission and Sub-Commission of "informa-
tion . . . contained in the communications listed . . . pursuant to . . . resolu-
tion 728F."
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retained, while at the same time making clear that definite documents,
two in the case of Greece and one in the case of Haiti, were being
specified and could be individually identified through reference to the
minutes of the private Sub-Commission meeting, which, though un-
published, were available to all Sub-Commission members.
When this matter was brought up in the Human Rights Commission
meeting in February and March 1968, an assortment of currents swirled
and surged over a period of several days, buffeting, but finally leaving
intact, the flimsy structure created during the previous months for the
examination of communications complaining about governmental op-
pression anywhere in the world.
Representatives of the Greek and Haitian Governments spoke at
length before the Human Rights Commission in an effort to vindicate
their governments, and to defend them against any accusation of human
rights violation. The Greek representative based his defense primarily
on the proposition that his government had properly exercised its right
of derogation, which he said precluded all possibility of human rights
violations." The Haitian actually discussed in detail various of the
hitherto confidential communications directed at itself. 2
The USSR Attacks
Self defense by the governments accused was therefore one of the
strong currents flowing and surging at the Human Rights Commission
meeting in early 1968. Another current was that of political attack.
The Soviet Union launched an attack against Greece, against Israel be-
cause of its alleged aggression, and against the United States because
of Vietnam." No one else attacked Greece, except that the representative
of Sweden, which had taken an initiative in the Council of Europe
against the Greek regime, spoke of the service rendered by the Sub-
Commission in bringing situations to the Commission's attention." No
government representative attacked Haiti, nor did any non-govern-
mental organization, although one non-governmental organization did
attack Greece, and one attacked Israel.
By launching its three-pronged attack, the Soviet Union was sanc-
tioning a broad interpretation of the proper scope of the UN's concern
with violations of human rights. Its assaults against Greece, Israel, and
11 U.N. Doc. E/4475-E/CN.4/972 (1968) at 66-67.
12 Id. at 69; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.970 (1968).
'1 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.965 (1968).
14 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.964 (1968).
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the United States were not consistent with the narrower view that only
racial discrimination like that in South Africa was a proper human
rights subject for UN concern.
The United Arab Republic advanced a theory which may be con-
sidered as in part a separate current from that of mere political attack,
because of its abstract rather than ad hoc approach. The Egyptian
principle explicitly proposed was that the Commission should concern
itself not only with southern Africa but also with human rights violations
occurring in war situations.1" This scope enabled it to bring under its
guns both Israel and the United States, a substantial advance beyond
the notion that the Sub-Commission, under its existing authority, was
confined to apartheid in South Africa and similar phenomena. The latter
position was argued by some, with the suggestion that consideration of
types of wrongs other than apartheid would jeopardize the sovereignty of
any nation represented in the Commission and open it to malicious and
slanderous attack.
An Opponent Fails
Tanzania introduced a draft resolution 1 which, while not clearly
saying so, was described by its author as having the purpose of cutting
down the jurisdiction of the Sub-Commission, to limit it in the future
to matters of apartheid and similar practices in South Africa. The
more objectionable features (from the U.S. standpoint) of the Tan-
zanian resolution were eliminated upon withdrawal of a separate U.S.
proposal. The Tanzanian resolution as shortened would have left the
record somewhat obscure, and given a basis for argument in the Sub-
Commission in October, 1968, over whether the Commission had in
fact reduced the Sub-Commission's area of responsibility. However,
Austria and the Philippines submitted amendments to the Tanzanian
proposal, to endorse and renew the Sub-Commission's previously wide
scope, whereupon, Tanzania withdrew its resolution altogether.17 This
left nothing before the Commission except a separate draft resolution
aimed at Israel.
The anti-Israel draft was presented as being humanitarian in pur-
pose and dealt with persons displaced during hostilities and their right
to return to their homes. A remarkable amount of accommodation and
"U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.966 (1968).16 Quoted in the Commission's Report, U.N. Doc. E/4475-E/CN.4/972 (1968)
at 59.
17 Id. at 62.
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compromise on the wording was brought about through lengthy consul-
tations, with the result that the proposal ended in such form that all mem-
bers except Israel were able to vote in its favor, while even Israel did not
find it necessary to vote against, or even abstain, but simply did not par-
ticipate in the voting.'8 The significance of the consultations can be judged
by the fact that the original wording included the word "deportation,"
which, if found as a fact, would have rendered Israel subject to being
charged with "crimes against humanity," on the theory advanced at
other times in the Commission that the definition in the Nuremberg
Charter can be applied to current situations. 9
The unanimous adoption of the U.A.R. resolution can be said to
confirm that the UN's present geographic capacity to take specific
action with respect to human rights violations is as broad as the whole
world. While it is true that the Middle East situation is an international
one, an international war is not far in this respect from a war within
the borders of one country. This is demonstrated in the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, which concern both types of hostility. Once one has
moved to the sphere of civil war, it is no great step to be concerned also
with civil unrest short of war.
The U.A.R. resolution, taken together with the fact that the Com-
mission has left undisturbed the broad scope of the Sub-Commission's
authority to concern itself with human rights violations the world over,
indicates that international human rights protection procedures are now
evolving apart from those embodied in treaties. Such a trend seems
inevitable in view of the reluctance or refusal of certain states to ratify
such treaties 20 and the limited scope of treaty protection " for oppressed
I8 Id. at 78-9.
19 The Commission's Special Rapporteur on apartheid and racial discrimination
presented a report asserting that conditions in southern Africa ". . . constitute
a 'crime against humanity' within the language of Article 6(c) of the 1945
London Charter of the International Military Tribunal which sat at Nuremberg."
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/949/Add. 4 (1968) at 496.
20 The United States has become a party to only one human rights treaty in
the past twenty years, that on Practices Akin to Slavery to which the Senate
gave its advice and consent in 1967, while several others such as Genocide,
Political Rights of Women, and Forced Labor have not been approved. The
communist countries, on the other hand, usually seek to avoid compulsory judicial
jurisdiction over such treaties. See Carey, Implementing Human Rights Treaties:
The Soviet View, 53 KY.L.J. 114 (1964).
21 Of the non-regional treaties, only the 1965 Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides for receipt of petitions from
individuals, and that at the separate option of States Parties. The 1966 Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights contains no such provision, although an Optional
Protocol thereto does do so.
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individuals. The extent to which non-treaty procedures develop depends
on the national policies guiding those attending inter-governmental meet-
ings, and on their forcefulness and leadership, as well as upon the in-
genuity of those who act unofficially to guide the course of the interna-
tional protection of human rights.
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